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ABSTRACT—In recent years, the media have consistently documented the
stories of teens who committed suicide or otherwise suffered severe
physical and psychological harm following periods of vitriolic
cyberbullying. While legislators and scholars have proposed several
solutions to combat cyberbullying, none have drawn on the work of social
psychologists to address the role that witnesses play in escalating bullying.
This Note proposes that the witnesses of cyberbullying be held liable under
a “Bad Samaritan” law for failing to report the most severe forms of
bullying where the witness reasonably believes the victim will suffer
physical harm. Drawing on the justifications for classic Samaritan laws in
both civil and common law jurisdictions, the Note suggests that a wellpublicized duty to report cyberbullying would undermine teens’ general
reluctance to report such abuse and provide the means for adults to
intervene to assist victims. Cyberbullying harms countless children, both
physically and emotionally; a complete response to the problem must hold
responsible not only the bully, but also the bystanders who, through their
silence, contribute to the bully’s power and the victim’s isolation.
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INTRODUCTION
Danny Alexander, a fifteen-year-old student at a private school in Los
Angeles, created and maintained a website to promote his budding acting
and singing career.2 A fellow student used the site’s comment function to
post the following message:
1

I want to rip out your fucking heart and feed it to you. . . . I’ve . . . wanted to
kill you. If I ever see you I’m . . . going to pound your head in with an ice
pick. Fuck you, you dick-riding penis lover. I hope you burn in hell.3

At least five other students posted similar threatening and derogatory
messages on his website, including “Faggot, I’m going to kill you” and
“[You need] a quick and painless death.”4 The death threats and abuse only

1
“Danny Alexander” is the pseudonym used by D.C. in his entertainment career. D.C. claimed
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress in a civil suit against his cyberbullies. See
D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 405, 407 (Ct. App. 2010).
2
Id. at 405.
3
Id. (alterations in original).
4
Id. at 406 (alterations in original).
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came to the attention of authorities when Alexander’s father read the
comments and contacted the school and law enforcement.5
In Benson, North Carolina, Justin Ray Jackson and Joshua Aaron
Temple created a Facebook page specifically to threaten a fifteen-year-old
classmate.6 Jackson threatened to run over the student with his pickup
truck, while Temple wrote “that he was bringing a gun to school to hunt
[the student].”7 Investigators only found the Facebook page after the
victim’s father reported the bullying.8
For these two teens and countless others across the nation, the Internet
is a threatening place where tormenters attack with impunity and friends
stand by in silence. Both of these students were fortunate to have parents
discover the threats and report them to the proper authorities, but how
much sooner might the bullying have ended if witnesses—often the
classmates and friends of these victims—had reported the threats and
abuse?
The bully has been a figure in adolescent life for centuries, but recent
research has drawn attention to a previously ignored participant in the
bullying relationship: the witness-bystander. Scholars now recognize that
bullying is not a dyadic, or two-person, relationship between the bully and
the victim, but rather a communal problem in which the witnesses and
bystanders to bullying behavior play a role in escalating the abuse. Even
while researchers redevelop how they understand bullying relationships,
the nature of bullying has changed as it moves from the playground to
cyberspace.
Although cyberbullying is a relatively new phenomenon, the legal
community has rushed to address the problem.9 After tragic stories of teen
suicide following online taunts, threats, and abuse, communities demanded
a response. Legislators and policymakers heeded the call by passing civil
and criminal sanctions aimed at a variety of bullying behaviors and
5
See id. Alexander brought a lawsuit against the students who posted the comments to his
Facebook page, alleging claims under California’s hate crime statute and common law claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. See id. at 405. The court denied the students’
“strategic lawsuit against public participation” (SLAPP) defense that the comments were in connection
with a matter of public interest because the students did not demonstrate that the messages they posted
were public speech. See id.
6
See Colin Campbell, Benson Teens Charged with Cyberbullying, NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Feb.
3, 2011), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/02/03/964768/benson-teens-charged-with-cyberbullying.
html.
7
Id.
8
See id. The case was settled out of court and all charges against Temple and Jackson were
dropped. Kelly Poe, North Carolina to Outlaw Student Cyberbullying of Teachers,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/10/23/2430928/northcarolina-to-outlaw-student.html.
9
For a survey of legislative and judicial methods of combating cyberbullying, see Alison Virginia
King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both
Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 852–65 (2010).
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imposing liability on bullies and educators alike. Although critiquing the
various solutions that have been proposed is beyond the scope of this Note,
each has failed to specifically consider the role witnesses and bystanders
play in the bullying relationship. Indeed, leveraging the role of the
bystander as part of the solution to cyberbullying has been almost entirely
ignored by legal theorists.10
This Note addresses this gap in the literature and proposes that
bystanders be held liable under “Bad Samaritan” laws when they fail to
report serious cyberbullying that threatens another person’s life or wellbeing. Part I introduces research regarding the structure of bullying
relationships, explores the online reincarnation of traditional bullying as
cyberbullying, and examines the reluctance of young people to report
bullying to adults. In addition, Part I describes the current legal status of
cyberbullying and addresses the challenges brought against legislation that
criminalizes it. Part II discusses the development of Samaritan laws in both
European civil law jurisdictions and Anglo-American common law
jurisdictions, and explores the reasons underpinning their adoption or
rejection. Part III proposes a model criminal statute creating a duty to
report cyberbullying that constitutes a threat of violence or is likely to
result in physical harm. Finally, Part IV analyzes how the proposed CyberSamaritan’s Duty would operate in practice and suggests that a duty to
report will attack the social and psychological underpinnings of teens’
reluctance to seek the help of adults when they encounter cyberbullying.
I.

BULLYING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A. Classic Bullying and Its Consequences
Bullying is a complex relational behavior that takes many forms.
Leading bullying scholar Dan Olweus11 defines bullying using three
components: (1) aggressive behavior with negative actions, (2) a pattern of
behavior over time, and (3) an imbalance of power or strength.12 Bullying is
a product of culture, learned from observing interactions between both
adults and peers.13 The media contributes to the culture of bullying by
immersing youth in violence and vulgar language and desensitizing them to
10

For a brief discussion of the role of bystanders in the search for a solution to bullying, see Darby
Dickerson, Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 51, 62–63 (2005).
11
Dan Olweus is generally regarded as a leading authority on bullying research, pioneering the
field with scientific studies of bullying problems among school children and developing the Olweus
Bullying Prevention Program aimed at restructuring the school environment to alter the costs and
rewards of bullying behavior. See Olweus Bullying Prevention Program: Brief Information About Dan
Olweus, CLEMSON UNIV. (Sept. 2003), http://www.clemson.edu/olweus/history.htm.
12
Recognizing Bullying, VIOLENCE PREVENTION WORKS!, http://www.violencepreventionworks.
org/public/recognizing_bullying.page (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
13
See Janis Entenman et al., Victims, Bullies, and Bystanders in K-3 Literature, 59 READING TCHR.
352, 354 (2006).
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these words and images.14 Bullying can involve either direct, open attacks
on a victim—such as kicking, taunting, and threatening—or indirect
manipulation of the victim’s social status.15 In this indirect form of
bullying, the bully changes the way that the victim’s peers perceive him
using social attacks, which ostracize the victim by spreading negative or
unflattering information and persuade others to alienate the victim.16
A complex group dynamic underlies all forms of bullying; bullies,
victims, and bystanders all play a role. The growing recognition of the
effect of group dynamics on bullying undermines the traditional dyadic
conception of bullying17 in which victims are characterized as weak for
failing to defend themselves.18 Instead, researchers have developed an
understanding of bullying as a complex social interaction shaped by adult
and peer awareness and behavior.19 Indeed, a number of studies indicate
that most bullying incidents are witnessed by bystanders.20 Whether the
bystanders are merely passive observers, who encourage bullying by
providing attention, or active participants, who join in the harassment,21
they become part of the bullying dynamic.22 The presence—or more
accurately, the absence—of adults also heightens the risk of bullying
behavior, as bullying is more likely to flourish in unsupervised areas.23
Peer bystanders are important to the bullying dynamic because
bullying is essentially a public display from which bullies derive power.24
This relationship suggests that bullying is not a conflict between peers
involving mutual disagreement, as it is commonly understood.25 Rather,
14
See SAMUEL C. MCQUADE, III ET AL., CYBER BULLYING: PROTECTING KIDS AND ADULTS FROM
ONLINE BULLIES 45–46 (2009).
15
See, e.g., Rona S. Atlas & Debra J. Pepler, Observations of Bullying in the Classroom, 92 J.
EDUC. RES. 86, 87 (1998).
16
See id.
17
See, e.g., René Veenstra et al., The Dyadic Nature of Bullying and Victimization: Testing a DualPerspective Theory, 78 CHILD DEV. 1843 (2007) (analyzing the bully–victim relationship from a dyadic
perspective).
18
See Entenman et al., supra note 13.
19
See Karin S. Frey et al., Reducing Playground Bullying and Supporting Beliefs: An Experimental
Trial of the Steps to Respect Program, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 479, 479 (2005); see also
Gianluca Gini et al., Determinants of Adolescents’ Active Defending and Passive Bystanding Behavior
in Bullying, 31 J. ADOLESCENCE 93, 94 (2008) (noting the recent scholarly focus on bullying as a group
process where the majority of students are witnesses to bullying rather than uninvolved).
20
See, e.g., Atlas & Pepler, supra note 15 (peers present in 85% of bullying episodes and actively
involved in two-thirds of the interactions); Frey et al., supra note 19 (bystanders present for over 80%
of bullying episodes); see also Jodie Lodge & Erica Frydenberg, The Role of Peer Bystanders in School
Bullying: Positive Steps Toward Promoting Peaceful Schools, 44 THEORY INTO PRAC. 329, 330 (2005)
(canvassing research finding peer bystanders involved in as many as 85% of bullying instances).
21
Lodge & Frydenberg, supra note 20.
22
Entenman et al., supra note 13, at 355.
23
See Atlas & Pepler, supra note 15, at 88; Frey et al., supra note 19.
24
Entenman et al., supra note 13, at 355.
25
See MCQUADE ET AL., supra note 14, at 35.
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bullying involves one-way aggression in which the bully dominates the
victim.26 Indeed, bullies often carefully select the targets and the setting of
a bullying episode to maximize the demonstration of power to peers.27 The
bully’s need for power and dominance in the peer social structure motivates
the bully to select a weaker peer to victimize.28 Bystanders, by their mere
presence and attention, provide at least tacit support so that the bully does
not act entirely alone.29 And bullies are more sensitive to this subtle
reinforcement from complicit bystanders than to any support provided to
the victim because defenders can provide comfort privately without directly
confronting the bully.30
The ubiquity of destructive bullying behavior carries physical,
emotional, and educational consequences for bullies, victims, and witnesses
alike. Adolescent victims of bullying are at greater risk for depression and
anxiety, loneliness and suicidal ideations, and physical changes in sleep
and eating habits.31 Targets of bullying also experience poor peer relations32
and withdraw from educational pursuits, missing more school, participating
less, and suffering decreased academic achievement.33 Bullies experience
negative social and health outcomes as well. They are at a higher risk of
abusing alcohol and drugs,34 becoming involved in criminal activity, and
forming abusive relationships.35 Similar patterns emerge with witnesses to
bullying, who are more likely to use alcohol and drugs, experience mental
health problems, such as depression and anxiety, and have lower
educational achievement.36 These potentially serious consequences for all
children and adolescents involved in bullying indicate that a more robust
effort must be made to address the problem.

26

See id.
Christina Salmivalli et al., Bystanders Matter: Associations Between Reinforcing, Defending,
and the Frequency of Bullying Behavior in Classrooms, 40 J. CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHOL. 668, 669 (2011).
28
See Recognizing Bullying, supra note 12.
29
See Barbara Coloroso, A Bully’s Bystanders Are Never Innocent, EDUC. DIG., Apr. 2005, at 49,
50.
30
See Salmivalli et al., supra note 27, at 674.
31
See ROBIN M. KOWALSKI ET AL., CYBER BULLYING: BULLYING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 26 (2008);
Effects of Bullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/topics/effects/index.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2013).
32
See Michele L. Ybarra & Kimberly J. Mitchell, Youth Engaging in Online Harassment:
Associations with Caregiver–Child Relationships, Internet Use, and Personal Characteristics, 27 J.
ADOLESCENCE 319, 321 (2004).
33
See Effects of Bullying, supra note 31.
34
See Ybarra & Mitchell, supra note 32.
35
See Effects of Bullying, supra note 31.
36
See id.
27
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B. Cyberbullying: Classic Bullying Intensified
While cyberbullying carries many of the same consequences for young
people as traditional face-to-face bullying, the Internet medium magnifies
the harm. Most adolescents equate the term “cyberbullying” with “bullying
via the Internet.”37 Researchers echo this idea, defining cyberbullying as
“willful and repeated harm inflicted through the medium of electronic
text,” in which hurtful content is disseminated to the victim, a third party,
or a public forum.38 Relational bullying and ostracism are particularly
problematic in cyberspace.39 The defining characteristics of cyberbullying
overlap with the criteria of traditional bullying: the perpetrator intends to
hurt the victim, the victim perceives the interaction as hurtful, the harmful
interactions are repetitive, and there is a power imbalance.40 Both are rooted
in aggression, but in cyberbullying, the aggression may or may not be
directed toward a target known to the bully in the offline world.41 Research
suggests, however, that there is considerable overlap between the young
people who are likely to be bullied in school and online.42 As with
traditional bullying, students involved in cyberbullying are likely to miss
school and have lower academic achievement, and to experience emotional
and physical health problems, including alcohol and drug use.43
Cyberspace is conducive to rampant bullying because it is a space
often beyond adult supervision. Traditional bullying occurs most frequently
in relatively unsupervised areas like the playground;44 cyberspace is akin to
a new Internet playground where adult vigilance does not intrude.45 Indeed,
37

Heidi Vandebosch & Katrien Van Cleemput, Defining Cyberbullying: A Qualitative Research
into the Perceptions of Youngsters, 11 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 499, 500 (2008).
38
Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: An Exploratory Analysis of Factors
Related to Offending and Victimization, 29 DEVIANT BEHAV. 129, 131 (2008) (quoting Justin W.
Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Bullies Move Beyond the Schoolyard: A Preliminary Look at
Cyberbullying, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 148, 152 (2006)).
39
See KOWALSKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 49.
40
See Vandebosch & Van Cleemput, supra note 37, at 501.
41
Ybarra & Mitchell, supra note 32.
42
See KAVERI SUBRAHMANYAM & DAVID ŠMAHEL, DIGITAL YOUTH: THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN
DEVELOPMENT 193 (2011).
43
What Is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/whatis-it/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
44
Atlas & Pepler, supra note 15, at 88.
45
See NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, TEENS AND CYBERBULLYING: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF A REPORT ON RESEARCH (2007), available at http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/
Teens%20and%20Cyberbullying%20Research%20Study.pdf (revealing teens’ perception that their
Internet use is mostly unsupervised by parents). To be sure, many Internet control services that allow
parents to block their children’s access to the inappropriate Internet sites exist. See, e.g., NET NANNY,
http://www.netnanny.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2013); PARENTAL CONTROL BAR, http://parentalcontrol
bar.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). However, web filters alone without direct parental supervision are
not sufficient to prevent children from accessing objectionable content, meaning that cyberspace is still
largely an unsupervised area. See Alorie Gilbert & Stefanie Olsen, Do Web Filters Protect Your Child?,
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as teens are confined to their homes much more than in past generations,
they turn to the Internet as a means of socializing with peers.46 Social
networking sites provide autonomy and escape from adult supervision.47
The freedom from supervision in turn decreases the role of social norms in
regulating antisocial behavior.48 This dearth of supervision and established
norms “allows bullying to escalate to dangerous, even life-threatening,
levels.”49 The Internet provides a hospitable environment for both
traditional bullying and new forms of harassment enabled by developing
technology.
The Internet and other forms of electronic communication also foster
harmful social behavior because such technology alters the nature of social
interactions. There are several unique characteristics associated with
cyberbullying that change the nature and consequences of bullying:
anonymity and resultant disinhibition, infinite bystanders, and perpetual
accessibility.50 When individuals act anonymously on the Internet, they
speak more harshly than they would in “real-life” interactions because they
are not held as accountable socially for deviations from normative
behavior.51 Anonymity can significantly increase aggression, dishonesty,
and other antisocial behaviors.52 In the absence of authority to set and
enforce clear boundaries and structure, teens lose their inhibitions and
engage in negative behavior.53 If people can hide behind anonymity and
CNET (Jan. 24, 2006, 9:29 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Do-Web-filters-protect-your-child—-page-2/
2100-1032_3-6030200-2.html?tag=mncol.
46
See HELENE GULDBERG, RECLAIMING CHILDHOOD: FREEDOM AND PLAY IN AN AGE OF FEAR
123 (2009).
47
See id.
48
See Tom Postmes et al., Breaching or Building Social Boundaries?: SIDE-Effects of ComputerMediated Communication, 25 COMM. RES. 689, 693 (1998). This idea is known in mainstream social
science literature as deindividuation, “a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation, causing
antinormative and disinhibited behavior.” Id. at 695.
49
Shaheen Shariff & Dianne L. Hoff, Cyber Bullying: Legal Obligations and Educational Policy
Vacuum, in CYBER CRIMINOLOGY: EXPLORING INTERNET CRIMES AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 359, 360
(K. Jaishankar ed., 2011).
50
See What Is Cyber Bullying?, VIOLENCE PREVENTION WORKS!, http://www.violenceprevention
works.org/public/cyber_bullying.page?menuheader=1 (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
51
Cf. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 140 (2007) (explaining that a person’s reputation suffers when he betrays secrets and spreads
false or malicious rumors); Linda Zener Solomon et al., The Effects of Bystander’s Anonymity,
Situational Ambiguity, and Victim’s Status on Helping, 117 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 285, 285 (1982)
(“[A]nonymous people are freed from social pressure to behave normatively . . . .”).
52
See M.E. Kabay, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace: Deindividuation, Incivility and
Lawlessness Versus Freedom and Privacy 9–10 (Mar. 16–18, 1998), http://www.mekabay.com/
overviews/anonpseudo.pdf. Even the officers of social networking sites have commented on the costs of
anonymity. Randi Zuckerberg, Facebook’s former marketing director, stated that “internet users would
‘behave a lot better’ if people were forced to use their real names when communicating on the internet.”
Richard Hall, Zuckerberg’s Sister Takes Aim at Internet Bullies, INDEP., July 29, 2011, at 2.
53
See Shariff & Hoff, supra note 49, at 365.
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escape the reputational consequences of their words, there is no
disincentive for escalating teasing, harassment, or threats. The kinds of
norms and social rules that encourage people to interact positively with one
another have not yet developed on the Internet, which creates a space
without the safety of enforced civility.54 Anonymity also works as an
“equalizer” by empowering individuals who would never bully in “real
life” to assert themselves with aggressive acts.55
Moreover, online bullying tends to escalate the scale and severity of
teasing and threats because bullies cannot see the impact of their words on
the victim. The social presence theory posits that the reduction of
contextual and visual cues in online communication reduces the
participants’ sensitivity to the real-world effects of their behavior.56 Users
are disembodied, removing the nonverbal communication of facial
expression and body posture that is present in face-to-face
communication.57 The use of electronic communication decreases the
sender’s awareness of how the receivers will perceive and react to the
communications.58 Bullies therefore seem not to understand that their
behavior has real-life costs; they see their hurtful messages as a fun way to
retaliate against their peers and feel better about themselves.59 The feeling
that online activities do not have offline consequences60 supports
antinormative and uninhibited aggression online.61
In addition, the Internet’s features magnify the effects of bullying by
opening access to the bullying relationship to a broader audience and
creating a permanent record of the aggression. Cyberbullying proves
insidious because it allows participation by an “infinite audience.”62 The
expansive potential audience reinforces the bully’s actions and facilitates
the display of power on which the bully thrives.63 This open access is
particularly troublesome because social network users often perceive public
exchanges as similar to private conversations where more personal details

54

See id. at 361.
See Vandebosch & Van Cleemput, supra note 37, at 502; see also Hinduja & Patchin, supra note
38, at 148 (explaining that historically disadvantaged groups face a level playing field in cyberspace
where their marginal status is not exposed).
56
See Shariff & Hoff, supra note 49, at 366.
57
See SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 42, at 13; Sara Kiesler et al., Social Psychological
Aspects of Computer-Mediated Communication, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1123, 1125 (1984).
58
See Postmes et al., supra note 48, at 692; Ybarra & Mitchell, supra note 32, at 320 (“[T]he user
cannot be seen nor the impact of his or her words on the other person be experienced.”).
59
SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 42, at 194.
60
See MCQUADE ET AL., supra note 14, at 41.
61
See Francine Dehue et al., Cyberbullying: Youngsters’ Experiences and Parental Perception,
11 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 217, 217 (2008).
62
Shariff & Hoff, supra note 49, at 365.
63
See KOWALSKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 60.
55
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might be readily shared.64 Users are typically unaware of how visible their
profiles are to the public,65 and they open themselves and their private
information to attack.
Young users also fail to understand that the information that appears
on the Internet becomes a permanent record, following them into the
future.66 On the Internet, there are no second chances; once information
about an individual’s misconduct leaks online, it cannot be concealed.67
Youthful indiscretions and past mistakes haunt people throughout their
lives even as they grow and change,68 which makes them “prisoner[s] of
[their] recorded past[s].”69 Open access and permanence, combined with the
tendency for Internet gossip to go “viral” and spread in a contagious
fashion, means that a particularly “sticky”70 piece of information can spread
to thousands of people quickly71 and with devastating effects for the
victim.72
Finally, cyberbullying intrudes on the victim more than traditional
bullying. The broad dissemination of personal information on the Internet
provides ample fodder for cyberbullies, who attack victims in both home
and school environments.73 The messages and images sent by a cyberbully
have the potential to harass the victim “any time of the day or night.”74 A
victim might be tormented by a traditional bully at school, but he can
escape to the safety of his home at the end of the school day and avoid the
abuse.75 No such escape exists for the victims of cyberbullying; the
ubiquity of online social interaction prevents a victim from ever completely
64

See Tammy Swenson Lepper, Facebook: Student Perceptions of Ethical Issues About Their
Online Presence, in THE ETHICS OF EMERGING MEDIA: INFORMATION, SOCIAL NORMS, AND NEW
MEDIA TECHNOLOGY 175, 175 (Bruce E. Drushel & Kathleen German eds., 2011).
65
See id. at 180.
66
See id.
67
See SOLOVE, supra note 51, at 72.
68
See id. at 73.
69
SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973), available at http://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=479784 (explaining how a universal identification system would allow more accurate
record keeping over the course of an individual’s entire lifetime).
70
A piece of information is “sticky” if it is interesting in a way that prompts people to keep talking
about it. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 25, 30–33 (2002). The conversation
potentially leads to a “tipping point” where the communication or gossip becomes an “epidemic.” Id.
71
See SOLOVE, supra note 51, at 61.
72
See, e.g., Alex Pasternack, After Lawsuits and Therapy, Star Wars Kid Is Back,
MOTHERBOARD (June 1, 2010), http://www.motherboard.tv/2010/6/1/after-lawsuits-and-therapystar-wars-kid-is-back. Ghyslain Raza, the “Star Wars Kid,” faced severe bullying after a video of him
imitating Star Wars light saber fights surfaced on the Internet and went viral. In response to the abuse
and harassment, he suffered depression and entered a psychiatric ward for children. Id.
73
See CARL TIMM & RICHARD PEREZ, SEVEN DEADLIEST SOCIAL NETWORK ATTACKS 111 (2010).
74
What Is Cyberbullying, supra note 43.
75
Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 38, at 136.
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eluding the reach of his bully, unless he also chooses to cut himself off
from his entire social network.76
C. The Code of Silence
Neither bullying victims nor bystanders report bullying to teachers,
parents, or law enforcement with any regularity. Instead, children maintain
a “code of secrecy,”77 an implicitly shared creed not to “snitch.”78 Indeed,
teens are twice as likely to talk about cyberbullying with friends as to
confide in parents or other adults.79 One reason that children choose not to
report bullying is the widely held perception that notifying adults rarely
leads to effective intervention.80 Students who approach school
administrators for support routinely experience a “wall of defense,”
creating an environment that tacitly condones bullying.81 Children also lack
confidence in their ability to intervene effectively in a bullying situation;
they fear that they will make the situation worse and lack knowledge of
what to do or confidence in their ability to act effectively.82 Bystanders are
especially prone to inaction without the support of other observers to
bolster their confidence to intervene on behalf of the victim.83 They might
also fear that reporting bullying to adults will make them the next target of
the bully’s ire.84
When bullying occurs through electronic communication, there is an
additional obstacle to reporting. Perhaps the greatest fear that restrains
students from reporting abusive online behavior is that adults will restrict
the reporting child’s digital access.85 Removing technology is a common
adult response to reports of cyberbullying, which many adolescents see as

76

See KOWALSKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 85–86. Even if a victim were to block a bully’s activity
on his own website or social network, cyberbullying could continue either on peers’ websites or through
the use of fictional user names.
77
Atlas & Pepler, supra note 15, at 88.
78
See MCQUADE ET AL., supra note 14, at 19.
79
NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 45.
80
See KOWALSKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 28; MCQUADE ET AL., supra note 14, at 31 (noting that
children perceive adults as lacking in empathy and understanding); Frey et al., supra note 19.
81
Shariff & Hoff, supra note 49, at 369. Surveyed plaintiffs in bullying litigation indicate that
school administrators blame the victims for inviting abuse, fault the parents for exaggerating the
problem, or absolve themselves of responsibility for protecting victims beyond a written policy. Id.
82
Coloroso, supra note 29; see also Gini et al., supra note 19, at 96 (explaining bystanders’ passive
reactions to bullying as a perceived lack of self-efficacy).
83
See KOWALSKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 33; Lodge & Frydenberg, supra note 20, at 333
(identifying “emotional support from friends as a factor related to the likelihood that peers would
support the victim”).
84
See Atlas & Pepler, supra note 15; Coloroso, supra note 29.
85
See Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, at A1.
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punitive toward the victim or reporter rather than the bully.86 Children who
have grown up saturated in new media, dubbed “digital natives,”87 may
communicate more through electronic devices than through face-time
interaction with family and peers.88 For the current generation of youth,
“media technologies are an important social variable and [the] physical and
virtual worlds are psychologically connected.”89 Online social networks
have become integrated into offline adolescent social life, which changes
peer relationships and even reshapes the meaning of a “friend.”90
Adolescents co-construct their online environments by using digital worlds
as a forum to explore offline developmental issues.91 Removing access to
electronic media constitutes a dramatic threat to teens’ identity exploration
and formation, both because cyberspace provides the perfect venue for
experimentation92 and because identity formation occurs in the context of
peer relationships,93 which now regularly unfold online. Therefore, the
apprehension that adults might respond to reports of cyberbullying with a
restriction on electronic media access is a powerful disincentive to
reporting bullying behavior.94
To address the cyberbullying problem and deter vitriolic behavior
between young people online, legislators and policymakers must break the
code of silence that deters young people from reporting cyberbullying. Any
bullying prevention initiative should include mechanisms to encourage
reporting by victims and bystanders.95 Cyberbullies are more likely to

86

What is Cyber Bullying?, supra note 50; see also KOWALSKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 3 (“Want
to punish a teenager? Simply threaten to take their computer away. To a teenager, that may seem to be a
punishment worse than death . . . .”).
87
Marc Prensky, Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants Part 1, ON THE HORIZON, Sept./Oct. 2001, at
1, 1.
88
See Diana D. Coyl, Kids Really Are Different These Days, 90 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 404, 405
(2009).
89
Kaveri Subrahmanyam & Patricia Greenfield, Online Communication and Adolescent
Relationships, FUTURE CHILD., Spring 2008, at 119, 124; see also Shariff & Hoff, supra note 49, at 362
(explaining that young people who grow up immersed in technology blur the distinction between their
virtual and “real” lives).
90
Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 89, at 126–27; see SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra
note 42, at 61–63.
91
See SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 42, at 34–35 (“[A]dolescents’ physical, social, and
digital worlds are intertwined and interconnected . . . and within their subjective experiences, the ‘real’
and ‘virtual’ may even blend with each other.”).
92
See Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 89, at 139 (“[T]hese media afford them
opportunities to explore as well as to practice self-disclosure and self-presentation, which are both
important steps toward constructing a coherent identity.”).
93
See Shariff & Hoff, supra note 49, at 368 (“[Teens’] virtual relationships have become an
integral aspect of their social relationships.”).
94
Despite this reluctance to confide in adults, nearly half of teens say that cyberbullying should be
reported to adults. See NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 45.
95
See KOWALSKI ET AL., supra note 31, at 35, 37.
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continue their abusive behavior if adult and peer bystanders are unlikely to
intervene.96
D. The Legal Status of Bullying
Communities, haunted by the tragic consequences of cyberbullying,
have demanded action from legislators and policymakers. Many state
legislatures have responded with cyberbullying and cyberharassment
statutes that take one of two forms.97 First, most states among those that
have enacted legislation delegate policymaking and enforcement of
cyberbullying rules to schools.98 These statutes charge schools with
developing a comprehensive bullying policy by consulting with parents,
teachers, administrators, and students.99 School policies are typically
required to include appropriate training and education mechanisms, as well
as disciplinary procedures and remedial responses to bullying.100 Some
states specifically mandate reporting to the school board or appropriate
school official when a student, parent, or school employee witnesses
bullying.101
The Supreme Court has responded to school attempts to restrict
student speech with a quartet of cases102 allowing schools to restrict student
speech that materially disrupts the educational environment so long as the
restrictions are motivated by pedagogical concerns.103 These cases are
inapposite to criminal cyberbullying statutes, however, because they
specifically address the authority of the school to restrict student speech on

96

Id. at 183.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309 (Supp. 2012) (electronic communication by minors of
sexual material depicting minors); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 135/1-2 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012)
(electronic harassment); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West 2010 & Supp. 2013) (mandatory school antibullying policies).
98
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (Supp. 2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O(c)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15.1 (West Supp.
2012). For a discussion of how schools are best positioned to respond to cyberbullying and why
legislation should be crafted to emphasize education over criminalization, see, e.g., Darcy K. Lane,
Note, Taking the Lead on Cyberbullying: Why Schools Can and Should Protect Students Online,
96 IOWA L. REV. 1791 (2011); Bethan Noonan, Note, Crafting Legislation to Prevent Cyberbullying:
The Use of Education, Reporting, and Threshold Requirements, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
330 (2011).
99
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(1) (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-314(a) (2011).
100
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(2); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-314(b).
101
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424(b) (LexisNexis 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-1167(4) (Supp. 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-130(B) (Supp. 2012).
102
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
103
For an extensive discussion of the standards developed by these cases, see Jessica Moy, Note,
Beyond ‘The Schoolhouse Gates’ and into the Virtual Playground: Moderating Student Cyberbullying
and Cyberharassment After Morse v. Frederick, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 565, 570–74 (2010).
97
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and off campus. A school’s authority to control the actions of students
implicates different interests than the government’s ability to restrict
harmful speech.
The second legislative response has been to criminalize the act of
cyberbullying itself. At the federal level, Representative Linda Sanchez
introduced the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act in 2009,
proposing to fine or imprison anyone using electronic communication to
harass another person or cause him or her emotional distress.104
Representative Sanchez introduced the bill to provide a tool to prosecutors
in cases like the suicide of thirteen-year-old Megan Meier following
cyberbullying via a fake MySpace profile.105 The House Committee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security failed to take further action on
the Act, however, because the bill as proposed threatened to
unconstitutionally restrict free speech.106
State legislatures have also developed statutes that hold the bullies
themselves criminally liable for their behavior.107 Within the last decade, at
least ten states have adopted or amended statutes to impose criminal
liability for cyberbullying or electronically threatening communications:
Arkansas,108 Idaho,109 Louisiana,110 Massachusetts,111 Missouri,112 Nevada,113
104
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. (2009). For the argument
that a federal cyberbullying criminal statute is the most effective and least restrictive means of
restricting cyberbullying behavior, see Christopher S. Burrichter, Comment, Cyberbullying 2.0: A
“Schoolhouse Problem” Grows Up, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 141, 167–74 (2010).
105
David Kravets, Cyberbullying Bill Gets Chilly Reception, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (Sept. 30.
2009, 6:37 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/cyberbullyingbill/.
106
See id.
107
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2011). For the contrary position that criminal
cyberbullying laws chill student free speech rights, see John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes:
Threat to Student Free Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85 (2011).
108
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217(b) (Supp. 2011) (“A person commits the offense of cyberbullying
if: (1) [h]e or she transmits, sends, or posts a communication by electronic means with the purpose to
frighten, coerce, intimidate, threaten, abuse, harass, or alarm another person; and (2) [t]he transmission
was in furtherance of severe, repeated, or hostile behavior toward the other person.”).
109
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A(2) (Supp. 2012) (“[Bullying] means any intentional gesture, or
any intentional written, verbal or physical act or threat by a student that: (a) [a] reasonable person under
the circumstances should know will have the effect of: (i) [h]arming a student; or (ii) [d]amaging a
student’s property; or (iii) [p]lacing a student in reasonable fear of harm to his or her person; or
(iv) [p]lacing a student in reasonable fear of damage to his or her property . . . .”).
110
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7(A) (Supp. 2013) (“Cyberbullying is the transmission of any
electronic textual, visual, written, or oral communication with the malicious and willful intent to coerce,
abuse, torment, or intimidate a person under the age of eighteen.”).
111
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (“Whoever willfully and maliciously
engages in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a specific
person, which seriously alarms that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, shall be guilty of the crime of criminal harassment . . . .”).
112
MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.090(1)(3) (West 2012) (“A person commits the crime of harassment if he
or she . . . [k]nowingly frightens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress to another person by
anonymously making a telephone call or any electronic communication . . . .”).
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New York,114 North Carolina,115 Rhode Island,116 and Utah.117 These statutes
make cyberbullying a misdemeanor118 and impose a small fine or short
sentence of imprisonment on violators.119
Because these statutes are of such recent vintage, there has been only
limited judicial response. Very few courts have addressed claims brought
pursuant to cyberbullying statutes.120 Even fewer have addressed challenges
to the constitutionality of such statutes. For example, in 2000, an earlier
form of the Utah electronic communications harassment statute that
forbade telephone harassment was challenged as unconstitutionally
overbroad.121 The Utah statute is not limited to cyberbullying, but rather
prohibits certain electronic communications made “with [the] intent to
annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, frighten, or
disrupt the electronic communications of another.”122
In Provo City v. Whatcott, a man convicted under the Utah law
challenged the constitutionality of statutory language that prohibited
“mak[ing] a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues[,]” and
“mak[ing] a telephone call and us[ing] any lewd or profane language or
suggest[ing] any lewd or lascivious act.”123 The court held that certain
sections of the statute were unconstitutionally overbroad because they
prohibited otherwise legitimate telephone calls that created a “reckless

113
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.915(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (“A person shall not, through the
use of any means of oral, written or electronic communication, including, without limitation, through
the use of cyber-bullying, knowingly threaten to cause bodily harm or death to a pupil or employee of a
school district or charter school with the intent to: (a) [i]ntimidate, harass, frighten, alarm or distress a
pupil or employee of a school district or charter school . . . .”).
114
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(1)(b) (McKinney 2008) (“A person is guilty of aggravated
harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person,
he or she . . . causes a communication to be initiated by mechanical or electronic means or otherwise
with a person . . . in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm . . . .”).
115
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a)(2) (2011) (criminalizing certain online activities done “[w]ith
the intent to intimidate or torment a minor or the minor’s parent or guardian”).
116
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2(a) (Supp. 2012) (“Whoever transmits any communication by
computer or other electronic device to any person or causes any person to be contacted for the sole
purpose of harassing that person or his or her family is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”).
117
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201(2) (LexisNexis 2012) (defining “electronic communication
harassment” as repeated electronic contact made with the “intent to annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend,
abuse, threaten, harass, frighten, or disrupt the electronic communications of another”).
118
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201(3)(a)(i).
119
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7(D)(1) (Supp. 2013).
120
Cf., e.g., Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43, 52 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App.
2012).
121
In 2005, the legislature amended the Act to include other forms of electronic communications.
See 2005 Utah Laws 864.
122
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201(2).
123
Provo City v. Whatcott, 1 P.3d 1113, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-9-201(1)(a) & (d) (1999)).
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risk” that the receiver would be offended.124 The court cautioned, however,
that the First Amendment does not provide the absolute right to annoy
another; rather, a statute must be drawn narrowly so as to avoid sweeping
into its ambit harmless communications that are constitutionally
protected.125 In Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, the court upheld the
constitutionality of another section of the statute prohibiting a person from
“mak[ing] repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues,
or after having been told not to call back.”126
Scholars have been more vocal than the courts in discussing the
constitutional challenges to cyberbullying laws. The most prominent
criticism of proposed and enacted cyberbullying statutes is that they
unconstitutionally restrict protected speech. Any legislation criminalizing
cyberbullying must balance the competing governmental interests in free
speech and protecting children.127 The free speech interest is significant, but
the governmental interest in protecting children is itself “compelling.”128
Although the Court has been most concerned in the past with protecting
children from sexual exploitation, it has “sustained legislation aimed at
protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the
laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected
rights.”129 Cyberbullying, though perhaps not as severely threatening to the
physical and emotional health of children as sexual abuse, represents a
significant threat to the emotional health of many children. Legislation that
prevents such harm may be constitutional even when it infringes to some
extent on protected speech.130
In addition, legislation criminalizing cyberbullying can be narrowly
crafted so as to fit restraints on speech into narrow categories of
unprotected speech, such as true threats.131 A prohibition on true threats—
statements which express an intent to commit violence—protects not
124

Id.
See id. at 1116.
126
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735, 737 (Utah 2004) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 769-201(1)(b) (1999)).
127
See Laura Pontzer, Note, If Words Could Kill: Can the Government Regulate Any Online
Speech?, 5 PITTSBURGH J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 153, 162 (2011).
128
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (upholding state legislation prohibiting
the distribution of child pornography); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982) (ruling that the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from public embarrassment during
their testimony is a compelling interest even if it does not justify a mandatory court closure rule).
129
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (emphasis added).
130
See Pontzer, supra note 127, at 163.
131
See Matthew C. Ruedy, Comment, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide: Should AntiCyberbullying Laws Be Created?, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 323, 340–44 (2008). For a discussion of how the
“fighting words” doctrine, another exception to speech protected by the First Amendment, might be
extended to apply to cyberbullying, see Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and
E-mails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2010).
125
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necessarily against actual violence, but against the fear of violence.132 The
Supreme Court distinguished true threats from hyperbolic speech in
excluding true threats from First Amendment protection.133 Although the
Court did not articulate a test for whether speech constitutes a true threat,
lower courts have developed a variety of tests,134 which might be applied to
cyberbullying legislation in the appropriate jurisdiction. Thus, with
appropriately narrow drafting, statutes that criminalize cyberbullying may
withstand constitutional attack.
This Note proposes that criminal liability should likewise attach to the
witnesses of cyberbullying who fail to report the behavior. A Bad
Samaritan law carrying criminal penalties will attack the code of silence
and encourage the (not so) innocent bystanders of clearly harmful
cyberbullying to report the abuse to law enforcement. An incentive to
report will both reduce the level of cyberbullying because the tacit support
of silent bystanders will be removed and bring threatening situations to the
attention of law enforcement before the harm occurs. Of course, a duty to
report cyberbullying could only logically attach in jurisdictions where
cyberbullying is itself a crime. Therefore, the proposed legislation could
only be enacted in a limited number of states currently. However, as states
continue to formulate legislative solutions to the rampant cyberbullying
problem, it is likely that the proposed law will have broader applicability.
II. BAD SAMARITAN LAWS135 AND BYSTANDER LIABILITY
The biblical parable of the Good Samaritan tells the story of a traveler
who took pity on the victim of a robbery and offered him medical care.136
The term Bad Samaritan now labels the stranger who knows that another
person is in immediate danger but fails to offer aid.137 Throughout history,
legal theorists and philosophers have debated whether the duty to offer aid
132

See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (finding that intimidation in the form of cross
burning creates fear in a particular group that they will be the target of violence).
133
See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (distinguishing
“political hyperbole” from true threats).
134
See e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
244 F.3d 1007, 1015 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 290 F.3d 1058
(9th Cir. 2002) (“Whether a particular statement may properly be considered to be a threat is governed
by an objective standard—whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to
harm or assault.” (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990))).
135
Although the terms Good Samaritan laws and Bad Samaritan laws are often used
interchangeably in the legal literature, I distinguish between the terms here. Good Samaritan laws refer
to the statutes and common law that provide protection from liability to those individuals that choose to
help another in distress. Bad Samaritan laws, which I focus on here, impose affirmative duties on
individuals to assist another person in peril or danger.
136
Luke 10:27–37.
137
Michael Davis, How Much Punishment Does a Bad Samaritan Deserve?, 15 L. & PHIL. 93, 93
(1996).
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to another in peril is a purely moral duty or whether it is a legal obligation
as well. The debate continues in modern American jurisprudence as the
traditional focus on autonomy and individualism bows to moral and civic
imperatives.
A. The History of Samaritan Laws
Civilizations throughout history have recognized various forms of
Samaritan duties to rescue and report.138 Ancient Egyptians imposed a
general duty to rescue, punishing by death those who found a person in
danger and did not act to protect them.139 In addition, Plato’s Laws included
broad duties to rescue with harsh penalties.140 Likewise, ancient German
laws severely punished Bad Samaritans who failed to aid neighbors in
distress.141 Such affirmative duties survived as moral imperatives in
medieval Europe, but it was not until the eighteenth century that European
jurisdictions began to embrace affirmative duties to rescue in limited
contexts, such as during times of external aggression or common
disasters.142
During the nineteenth century, many European nations began to enact
criminal causes of action based upon violations of the duty to rescue.143 By
the turn of the twentieth century, roughly half of the continental legal
systems recognized a general duty to rescue in criminal law.144 And in the
twentieth century, European civil law jurisdictions began to embrace
broader formulations of the duty to rescue. During and after World War II,
138
For a detailed global history of Samaritan laws, see Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and
Ugly: A Comparative Law Analysis, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 81–88 (2005).
139
Alberto Cadoppi, Failure to Rescue and the Continental Criminal Law, in THE DUTY TO
RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 93, 97 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds.,
1993).
140
See, e.g., PLATO, THE LAWS 272–73 (A.E. Taylor trans., 1960) (“Every bystander of native
birth, child or woman or man, shall join in the rescue . . . and any that takes no part shall be held by the
law under the curse of the god of kindred and family.”).
141
See Cadoppi, supra note 139.
142
See Schiff, supra note 138, at 82–83.
143
See Cadoppi, supra note 139, at 99–100. The Spanish Criminal Code of 1822 imposed criminal
liability for breach of the duty to rescue. Id. Likewise, the “Police” Code of Würtemberg in Germany
and the Criminal Code of the Kantan Thurgau of 1841 both contained general duties to rescue. Id. at 99.
Bolivia and Russia soon followed, and in the latter half of the nineteenth century, similar statutes
appeared in Tuscany, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Italy. Id. at 100.
144
See id. Although these statutes do not include any explanatory language justifying the
imposition of affirmative duties, European civil law jurisdictions have traditionally placed greater
importance on civic duty and less on citizens’ rights than Anglo-American common law jurisdictions.
See Alison McIntyre, Guilty Bystanders? On the Legitimacy of Duty to Rescue Statutes, 23 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 157, 158 (1994). Similarly, scholars have explained the lack of Good Samaritanism in China
as a product of a traditional cultural focus on personal networks, which leaves the plight of strangers
outside of an individual’s scope of concern. See Stanley Lubman, Op-Ed., After the Foshan Tragedy:
China’s Good Samaritan Debate, BERKELEY L. (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/12597.
htm.
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Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal all adopted or broadened
preexisting statutes creating a duty to rescue.145 Almost every European
nation and every Latin American nation has now enacted a duty to rescue
provision in their criminal codes.146
Absent a special relationship between the would-be rescuer and the
one in peril, however, no common law legal obligation to rescue arose.147
English law does not recognize a general legal obligation to save a stranger
in peril; rather, “[t]here must be some additional reason why it is fair and
reasonable that one person should be regarded as his brother’s keeper and
have legal obligations in that regard.”148 Likewise, American courts have
traditionally been resistant to the imposition of affirmative duties unless
those duties arose from a special relationship of dependence, by contract,149
or by statute.150 The Restatement (Second) of Torts encapsulates the
traditional position that affirmative duties exist only as a product of special
relationships.151

145
See Schiff, supra note 138, at 86–87. Although several of the duty-to-rescue statutes were
enacted under the control of Nazi Germany and its totalitarian philosophy, the statutes were some of the
very few to survive the repeal of legislation passed during the occupation after the collapse of German
power. See id.
146
See id.; see also Cadoppi, supra note 139, at 104. Currently, the only two civil law countries in
the European Union that do not embrace a general duty to rescue are Finland and Sweden. See Jan M.
Smits, The Good Samaritan in European Private Law; On the Perils of Principles Without a Programme
and a Programme for the Future, Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University 5 (May 19, 2000), available
at http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=3773. When Sweden considered enacting a duty-to-rescue law in
2011, the official who led the inquiry into the effects of such a law advised against it because he
thought it would increase the difficulty of getting people to act as witnesses. See Sweden Mulls
‘Good Samaritan’ Law, LOCAL (Swed.) (Mar. 11, 2011, 10:18 PM), http://www.thelocal.se/32530/
20110311/.
147
See Schiff, supra note 138, at 85.
148
Stovin v. Wise, [1996] A.C. 923 (H.L.) 931 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) (Eng.).
149
See Smits, supra note 146, at 10–11. For an early case exemplifying the common law rejection
of affirmative duties, see Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898) (“With purely moral
obligations the law does not deal. . . . Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe
on the track, and a car approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to himself, and the
instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless
savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the child’s injury . . . .”).
150
See Jennifer Bagby, Note, Justifications for State Bystander Intervention Statutes: Why Crime
Witnesses Should Be Required to Call for Help, 33 IND. L. REV. 571, 573 (2000).
151
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 314A (1965). Professor D’Amato argues that the
“‘Bad Samaritan’ paradigm is part of a larger paradigm linking the law of torts with the criminal law.”
Anthony D’Amato, The “Bad Samaritan” Paradigm, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 798, 798 (1975). He argues,
however, that Bad Samaritan laws are not based on personal duties between the victim and the potential
rescuer, but on the principle that both are members of the community and should be expected to act
responsibly. See id. at 806. Regardless, the law of torts and criminal law often inform one another, as
with the imposition of affirmative duties.
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B. Modern American Trends in Bystander Liability
1. Traditional Resistance.—American legislators and legal scholars
have traditionally been resistant to affirmative legal duties as compared to
European and Latin American civil jurisdictions. This resistance is
surprising in light of the broad acceptance of utilitarianism as a normative
theory of law, as utilitarianism explains justice in terms of the positive
obligation to maximize the benefit to society.152 However, the common law
reluctance to impose a duty to rescue or assist victims of crime is
understandable as a product of a philosophical and political climate that
praises individualism and autonomy and respects privacy.
Perhaps the most prolific argument against affirmative legal duties is
the threat they pose to the common law’s traditional respect for individual
liberty.153 American society values the principle of individualism—the right
to be left alone—and rejects the imposition of affirmative legal duties.154
According to this view, the victim of a crime cannot impose duties that
restrict the freedoms and rights of the people around him.155 The American
focus on individualism, however, obscures the social causes of “individual”
victimization156 and the social responsibility that members of a community
have for one another.157 Likewise, the social value placed on autonomy, and
the accompanying characteristics of self-sufficiency and resiliency,
diminish a witness’s perception of a victim’s suffering and make it less
apparent that assistance is really needed.158 Even half a century ago, a
commentator noted that “there is much to be said for the old AngloAmerican attitude of minding your own business—except that as the world
changes, other peoples’ business in more and more ways becomes
yours.”159 This philosophy is even more evident today, especially in
cyberspace as the boundary between public and private information erodes
and the old emphasis on individualism becomes more out of step.
152

See Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J.
605, 605 (2001).
153
See, e.g., id. at 632. For a detailed discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of the
libertarian position, see id.
154
See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 47 (1987).
155
See John Kaplan, A Legal Look at Prosocial Behavior: What Can Happen for Failing to Help
or Trying to Help Someone, J. SOC. ISSUES, Summer 1972, at 219, 220.
156
Individuals become victims of crime because of both individual characteristics and community
characteristics, including socioeconomic factors, age distribution, and social integration. See Motoko
Akiba et al., Student Victimization: National and School System Effects on School Violence in 37
Nations, 39 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 829, 833–34 (2002). Therefore, an overemphasis on individualism fails
to account for the way that an individual operates within the community.
157
See MAUREEN H. O’CONNELL, COMPASSION: LOVING OUR NEIGHBOR IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 21 (2009).
158
See id. at 22.
159
Charles O. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in THE
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 23, 38 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966).
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Respect for the victim’s privacy also contributes to the resistance to
affirmative duties to rescue or report. A duty to report a crime may
unacceptably violate the victim’s privacy, especially for victims of sexual
offenses.160 For example, victims of rape may choose not to prosecute to
avoid the psychological trauma of reliving the abuse,161 and the common
law resists violating individual privacy.162 And although victims of crime
have been traditionally treated as third parties without individual standing
in the common law criminal justice system,163 they have gradually begun to
gain power in the process.164 In addition, reporting may do more harm than
good in certain contexts where the victim fears retaliation from the bully.165
In that case, Bad Samaritan laws might prompt too much action and
encourage people to intervene in others’ private affairs.166 These concerns,
while particularly applicable to sexual offenses and other personally
invasive crimes, have little weight for required reporting of cyberbullying.
By their very nature, the communications that will be reported are already
public,167 and a report to law enforcement will not further intrude on the
privacy of the victim.
2. Justifications for Bad Samaritan Laws.—The growing trend in
American law toward acceptance of affirmative duties to aid168 developed
from increasing recognition of the important moral and political reasons for
these duties. One primary justification for Bad Samaritan legislation is the
desire for the criminal law to reflect the moral imperative to render aid to

160
SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 201
(8th ed. 2007).
161
See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 154, at 177 (describing the secondary victimization that occurs
during a rape prosecution, where the victim is called as a witness and forced to relive her experience
while undergoing cross-examination that questions her truthfulness and morality).
162
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198
(1890) (“The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent
his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”).
163
See Victim Privacy and the Open Court Principle, CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2003/rr03_vic1/p8.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
164
See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 154, at 148–50 (describing recent social movements to grant
more rights to victims, including greater participation in the prosecution or compensation to victims).
165
See KADISH ET AL., supra note 160.
166
Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44 GA. L.
REV. 607, 658 (2010).
167
Although such communications may be initially shared with only a limited group of people,
such as a network of friends on a social site, an individual loses proprietary control over
communications upon posting them on the Internet. Any communication may be shared more broadly
than the original poster intended, without that person’s knowledge or consent. Therefore, even
seemingly private conversation between known individuals becomes “public” by virtue of entering
cyberspace.
168
See infra text accompanying notes 190–202 for a survey of state statutes imposing affirmative
duties.
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others in need.169 In a series of lectures, Lord Patrick Devlin,170 a fellow of
the British Academy, expounded on morality and the law. In his
explanation of morals in the criminal law, he stated:
[T]he morals which underly [sic] the law must be derived from the sense of
right and wrong which resides in the community as a whole; it does not matter
whence the community of thought comes, whether from one body of doctrine
or another or from the knowledge of good and evil which no man is
without.171

When the criminal law mirrors moral obligations, it fulfills the expectations
held by the majority of citizens.172 Indeed, when “[l]egal and moral rules
are in symbiotic relation,” individuals learn morality by observing the
behaviors that are enforced by authorities.173
The moral imperative to aid strangers in distress is nearly universal
across world religions174 and has also become established in the public
morality—the “community of ideas” in a society about how its members
should conduct themselves.175 However, the question of whether the law
should be consistent with morality has been debated for centuries, and there
are many areas in which the law does not align with conventional
morality.176 Regardless, American criminal law is to a large extent based on
moral principles, and a number of crimes function solely to enforce a moral

169

See Bagby, supra note 150, at 579.
Lord Devlin, a leading British judge, argued against the philosophical basis of the Wolfenden
Report, which recommended that private acts of homosexuality should not be a criminal offense.
William Miller, Conservatism and the Devlin-Hart Debate, 1 INT’L J. POL. & GOOD GOVERNANCE,
Quarter III 2010, at 1–2. His debate with H.L.A. Hart sparked a global discussion over the place of
morality in the criminal law. Id. at 1.
171
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 22 (1965).
172
See Antony M. Honoré, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW,
supra note 159, at 225, 239.
173
D’Amato, supra note 151, at 809.
174
See Bagby, supra note 150, at 580; accord 2 TALMUD BAVLI: TRACTATE SANHEDRIN 73a
(Rabbi Yisroel Simcha Schorr ed., Rabbi Michoel Weiner & Rabbi Asher Dicker trans., Mesorah
Publ’ns, ltd. 1994) (commanding under Talmudic law: “Do not stand by the blood of your friend but
rather save him.”); Inqadh, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 138 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003) (“In
Islamic law, there is a duty to rescue a person in distress as long as the rescuer does not unduly
endanger her-or himself.”); Kinh Phḁm-Võng, Sutra Translation Comm. of the U.S. & Can., Brahma
Net Sutra: Moral Code of the Bodhisattvas (Jan. 2000), http://www.ymba.org/bns/bnsframe.htm
(explaining that the moral code of the Bodhisattvas requires as a secondary precept that any disciple of
Buddha who sees a sick person should provide for that person’s needs).
175
See DEVLIN, supra note 171, at 9. Devlin conceives of morality as a sphere in which there are
conflicting public and private interests. See id. at 16. The two are in proper balance when there is
“toleration of the maximum individual freedom that is consistent with the integrity of society.” Id.
176
See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 154, at 46. For example, adultery is widely considered immoral,
but in most jurisdictions it is no longer a criminal offense. Id.
170
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principle, not to maintain public order or any other function of criminal
law.177
In addition to the need to align the criminal law with shared moral
principles, Bad Samaritan laws are justified by the common interest in
public safety. There already exists a civic duty to come forward with
information concerning a crime.178 Statutory duties to report merely codify
and enforce this existing civic duty. The common interest of the public in
avoiding harm also justifies a criminal Bad Samaritan statute. Harm
prevention is a legitimate objective of criminalization, including both
forbidding people from actively causing harm and requiring them to
prevent harm.179 Bad Samaritan statutes operate as a social insurance
mechanism, similar to taxes for police protection,180 and minimize the
deaths and injuries associated with criminal activity.181 They prevent harm
by prohibiting the exercise of personal liberties to the detriment of others.182
While affirmative duties impinge slightly on personal liberty, as with other
criminal statutes, the social interests served by the criminal law justify the
limitation on personal liberty.183 Finally, Bad Samaritan legislation is
justified by its ability to protect the public interest through deterring the
antisocial behavior of “[w]itnessing a crime and ignoring the plight of the
victim.”184
The normative influence of criminal law also justifies Bad Samaritan
statutes as a means of influencing psychological motivations to intervene.
Criminal statutes that impose a duty to assist crime victims create a societal
expectation of intervention that encourages individuals to internalize
helping behavior and normalizes the responsibility of witnesses.185 Bad
Samaritan laws send the message that failing to aid a fellow human in
distress is morally wrong and that the community has acted together to
express its outrage; they serve to counter the alienation and indifference of
modern society.186
The utilitarian movement toward statutory affirmative obligations
arose in reaction to contemporary social norms, which lack the power, in
light of weaker ties to religious institutions and community, to motivate

177

See DEVLIN, supra note 171, at 7. Devlin cites several examples of such laws, including
prohibitions on assisted suicide and incest. See id.
178
See Bagby, supra note 150, at 580.
179
See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 128
(1984).
180
Davis, supra note 137, at 94.
181
See Levy, supra note 166, at 626–27.
182
See FEINBERG, supra note 179, at 129.
183
See Bagby, supra note 150, at 581.
184
Id. at 583; see D’Amato, supra note 151, at 808.
185
See Bagby, supra note 150, at 583–86.
186
See Levy, supra note 166, at 628–29.
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moral action absent the coercive or normative effect of the law.187 Recent
empirical research indicates that a slight majority of Americans support a
law requiring people to assist anyone in distress.188 In light of this utilitarian
movement and the sociological and psychological justifications for
affirmative duties, a growing number of states have enacted or are
developing Bad Samaritan laws that create an affirmative duty to act in aid
of another person.189
3. The Modern Samaritan’s Duties.—Statutes that impose an
affirmative duty on bystanders to assist victims of crime generally take one
of two forms: the duty to rescue or the duty to report. Several states,
including Minnesota,190 Rhode Island,191 and Vermont,192 have enacted
statutes requiring a bystander to rescue a victim when there is no danger to
the rescuer. Other states, including California,193 Colorado,194 Florida,195
Hawaii,196 Massachusetts,197 Nevada,198 Ohio,199 Rhode Island,200 and
Washington,201 have adopted criminal statutes that impose on witnesses of
certain crimes the duty to report to law enforcement. Still others, such as
Wisconsin, impose more generally a duty to aid, whether by direct
assistance or reporting to authorities.202 Currently, most American statutes
impose very lenient misdemeanor penalties on “Bad Samaritans,” such as

187
See Amelia H. Ashton, Note, Rescuing the Hero: The Ramifications of Expanding the Duty to
Rescue on Society and the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 69, 81 (2009).
188
Victoria Time et al., Don’t Help Victims of Crime If You Don’t Have the Time: Assessing
Support for Good Samaritan Laws, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 790, 792 (2010).
189
At the time of writing, three states—Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Nevada—had enacted
both anti-bullying legislation and affirmative duty legislation.
190
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2010).
191
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2002).
192
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2002).
193
CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West Supp. 2013) (certain crimes against children).
194
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-115 (2012) (general duty to report crimes).
195
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West 2007) (duty to report sexual battery).
196
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6(a) (LexisNexis 2012) (crimes involving “serious physical
harm”).
197
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (LexisNexis 2010) (certain violent crimes).
198
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.882 (LexisNexis 2012) (crimes against children).
199
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (general duty to report felonies
and additional duties for physicians).
200
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-1-5.1, 11-37-3.1 (2002) (certain violent crimes).
201
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 2010) (violent crimes and sexual crimes against
children).
202
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 2005) (“Any person who knows that a crime is being
committed and that a victim is exposed to bodily harm shall summon law enforcement officers or other
assistance or shall provide assistance to the victim.”).
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small fines and jail time of up to six months.203 Even then, prosecutions are
rare.204
While these statutes vary in scope and application, they impose duties
that reflect the four main elements of Bad Samaritan statutes.205 First,
affirmative duties to assist only arise when a person’s life, health, or safety
is in peril, although some jurisdictions impose a duty to rescue only when
there is danger to life.206 Often, state statutes impose a duty only when there
is peril created by some specific crime, such as child abuse207 or specified
violent crimes.208 Other states create a general duty to assist victims of any
physically harmful crime.209 Second, the scope of the duty to assist ranges
from a duty to merely report what was witnessed to the appropriate
authority to the duty to act personally in a rescue.210 Third, there is variation
between statutes as to whether action is required when there is a high
degree of risk to the would-be rescuer.211 Finally, statutes differ on whether
mere knowledge of the peril is sufficient to trigger the duty or whether
physical presence at the scene of danger is necessary.212

203
See Bagby, supra note 150, at 591. By contrast, many European jurisdictions attach harsher
penalties to their duties to assist and enforce them more consistently. KADISH ET AL., supra note 160, at
201. For example, France’s duty to rescue carries a penalty including up to five years of imprisonment.
Levy, supra note 166, at 617; accord CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 223-6 (Fr.).
204
KADISH ET AL., supra note 160, at 200. Prosecutors rarely pursue violators of affirmative duties
to report in part because of the difficulty in determining whether a witness was actually present at the
scene of a crime. See Bagby, supra note 150, at 591. This difficulty is reduced in cyberspace where
users leave a digital footprint recording their presence online.
205
The following comparison of textual elements borrows from Damien Schiff’s comparative
study of Samaritan Laws across civil and common law jurisdictions. See Schiff, supra note 138, at 94–
103.
206
Id. at 94; accord Cadoppi, supra note 139, at 105 (noting that some states impose a duty to
rescue only in cases of mortal danger while “[m]ost criminal codes do not require anything more than a
vague danger”).
207
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.882
(LexisNexis 2012).
208
See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (LexisNexis 2010) (“Whoever knows that another
person is a victim of aggravated rape, . . . murder, manslaughter or armed robbery . . . [shall] report said
crime . . . .”).
209
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2010) (“A person at the scene of an
emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall . . .
give reasonable assistance to the exposed person.”).
210
See Schiff, supra note 138, at 96–98.
211
Id. at 99; see also Cadoppi, supra note 139, at 106–07 (explaining that most Bad Samaritan
statutes contain exceptions that exempt the rescuer if he runs a risk of danger, whether any risk at all or
only risk of serious danger).
212
See Schiff, supra note 138, at 101.
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III. THE CYBER-SAMARITAN’S DUTY
A. The Duty to Report
This Note proposes a Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty to report
cyberbullying213 that encompasses either one of two situations: (1) the
cyberbullying includes threats of violent criminal behavior or (2) the
witness knows or reasonably believes the cyberbullying will cause physical
harm or the fear of physical harm.214 The intervention of law enforcement
in these situations is likely to be most beneficial to the victim by
introducing the assistance of authorities before the victim suffers harm.
A Bad Samaritan law is particularly appropriate for bullying because
the traditional distinction between an act and an omission is inapposite in
the group dynamic of bullying.215 Some argue that Bad Samaritan laws
violate a fundamental precept of criminal law and morality that “people
may be blamed and punished only for what they do, not for what they do
not do.”216 However, bystanders by their very presence “act” in the sense of
providing support and encouragement to the bully.217 In cyberspace, the
bully sees the implicit support of the bystanders through the “hits” a
website receives or the “likes”218 for a particular piece of text or image.
When bystanders play a fundamental role in the harm perpetrated by a third
party, the distinction between an act and an omission collapses.
An example of proposed language for such a statute is the following:
Duty of witness of cyberbullying
(1) Definitions:
(a) Cyberbullying means threatening or harassing electronic
communication.
(b) Electronic media means social networking sites, webpages, or
other Internet platforms through which electronic text, pictures, or
video are communicated.
213

The Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty would only apply in jurisdictions where cyberbullying itself has
been criminalized, as affirmative duties to report only apply to witnesses of criminal activity.
214
Although the worst consequences of cyberbullying may be emotional and psychological,
traditionally only crimes resulting in physical harm trigger affirmative duties to report. See supra text
accompanying notes 206–09. The emotional and psychological harm caused by cyberbullying may be
partially redressed by the duty to act arising from a victim’s fear of physical harm. Stalking statutes
similarly establish criminal liability when a stalker intends to cause his victim actual fear or when the
stalking behavior would cause a reasonable person to feel fear. See NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
ANALYZING STALKING LAWS 1, available at http://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/analyzingstalking-statute.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
215
See supra text accompanying notes 17–24.
216
Levy, supra note 166, at 630.
217
See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
218
The “like” feature on Facebook is a way to provide positive feedback regarding a particular
piece of content or page on the website. See Facebook Help Center: Like, FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/help/like (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
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(2) A person who witnesses the actual commission of:
(a) The threat of a violent offense against a minor conveyed through
electronic media; or
(b) Electronic communication that the person knows or reasonably
believes poses an actual threat of substantial bodily harm against a
minor or would cause a reasonable person to fear substantial bodily
harm,
shall as soon as reasonably possible notify law enforcement or other
public officials, unless the person reasonably believes such notification
creates danger or peril to any person.
(3) The duty contained in subsection (2) arises only when the electronic
media publicly records the witness’s presence.
(4) Failure to report as required by subsection (2) is punishable by fine,
enrollment in educational or rehabilitative programs, and/or removal
from electronic media that facilitate cyberbullying.
(5) No person will be criminally charged for failure to report as required by
subsection (2) if such person subsequently volunteers information to
law enforcement or other public officials.

The proposed Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty mirrors the language of already
enacted state statutes and follows the four elements of Bad Samaritan laws
identified by comparative law theorists.
First, the proposed law imposes a duty only when there is a threat to
life, health, or safety. When electronic communication includes a threat of
violence, it clearly creates a risk of physical harm. In addition, the
affirmative legal duty may be triggered even where the victim herself
creates the danger to life or safety. Numerous examples exist of young
people who have committed suicide in response to extended periods of
cyberbullying and harassment.219 A person who knows that the victim of
bullying will attempt suicide has a duty to report to law enforcement
because the law “puts human life beyond and above the disposal of the
individual,” and the duty to rescue arises out of the public interest in
protecting human life.220 The argument that suicide does not trigger the
duty to assist rests on the assumption that an individual attempting suicide
does not desire help or rescue.221 However, many researchers now view
219
The term “bullycide” has been coined to describe the spike in teen suicides caused by bullying.
See, e.g., NEIL MARR & TIM FIELD, BULLYCIDE: DEATH AT PLAYTIME (2d rev. ed. 2011). Wellpublicized examples of American bullycides include Megan Meier, Ryan Halligan, Tyler Clementi, and
Phoebe Prince, among others. Associated Press, Teens Who Have Committed Suicide After Being
Bullied Online, NPR (Sept. 30, 2010, 5:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
130248877.
220
Aleksander W. Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 159, at 91, 97–98; see also Levy, supra note 166, at 613
(arguing that human life has intrinsic value and that “bad Samaritanism fails to respect and promote the
premium that we place on human life”).
221
See Rudzinski, supra note 220, at 97.
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suicide as a “cry for help”; this research indicates that many young people
driven to suicide really do desire the help of their peers and adults.222
If a witness to cyberbullying knows or reasonably believes that the
victim of cyberbullying might harm herself, he is obligated to report. The
reasonable belief might arise from a statement made by the victim or from
personal knowledge about the victim’s mental or emotional state and the
likely effect of the cyberbullying. This duty does not impose liability on
every person who sees malicious or hurtful comments directed at an
individual who subsequently commits suicide. The statute imposes liability
only on those individuals who observe situations where a reasonable person
would believe the victim might harm himself and fail to report to law
enforcement. If the witness is a child, this reasonableness standard requires
that the child act like a “reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and
experience under like circumstances.”223 Therefore, the duty to report arises
when a reasonable person witnessing the cyberbullying would believe that
the bully or the victim herself is likely to cause the victim physical harm.
Second, the Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty imposes only a duty to report for
witnesses to abusive electronic communication. The duty to rescue is more
intrusive than the duty to report and is impractical in cyberspace where
there is little a bystander can do to “rescue” the victim of a harassing
communication. A witness to cyberbullying might “rescue” a victim by
flagging a communication to convey to the cybercommunity that it is
abusive or derogatory.224 Many websites, however, do not offer this
flagging feature, and even this step would not be effective rescue because
of the permanence and accessibility of Internet communications. By
contrast, states could implement simple reporting systems, such as hotlines
or reporting websites, to reduce the effort required by young people to
make a report.
Third, the proposed language of the Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty requires
action only when there is no risk of harm to the witness-reporter. A witness
might reasonably fear that if he reports cyberbullying, the bully will next
attack him. Indeed, this fear of retribution is one of the reasons that
children are traditionally reluctant to intervene in bullying.225 Such
222
See Linda J. Vorvick & David B. Merrill, Suicide and Suicidal Behavior, MEDLINEPLUS, http://
www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001554.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2012).
223
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965).
224
Craigslist employs a community moderation system that allows users to flag postings that
violate the website’s guidelines. See About>Help>Flags and Community Moderation, CRAIGSLIST,
http://www.craigslist.org/about/help/flags_and_community_moderation (last updated Apr. 17, 2012,
2:44 PM). If a particular posting attracts sufficient flags, the content is subject to removal. See id. Using
a similar system, YouTube employs a staff to review flagged content and remove it if it violates the
Terms of Use. See YouTube Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/community_
guidelines (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). A similar system could be employed by social networking sites
to allow users to flag cyberbullying content as abusive or threatening.
225
See supra Part I.C.
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retribution is unlikely in the context of cyberbullying, however, because the
identity of the reporter will remain unknown to the cyberbully so long as
authorities maintain the reporter’s anonymity.226 Nonetheless, the proposed
statute acknowledges that there may be circumstances in which a witness to
cyberbullying reasonably believes that by reporting to authorities he places
himself, the victim, or another person in danger. In those circumstances, the
obligation to report does not arise.
Finally, the proposed statutory language only imposes a duty to report
on individuals who themselves witness an act of cyberbullying and whose
digital presence is publicly recorded. Digital presence might be publicly
reported in either a personal sense, where an individual manifests her
presence through activity on a site,227 or in an impersonal sense, where an
individual’s presence is recorded in the aggregate on a site.228 Public digital
presence is necessary for the duty to arise because it is the presence of
bystanders that lends support to the bully.229 While any person who knows
of a victim may alert law enforcement to the danger, the mere knowledge
of cyberbullying does not impose an affirmative duty because the person is
not a bystander. Bystanders lend implicit support to the bullying through a
supportive presence only when the bully knows that the bystander
witnessed the bullying.
The requirement of public digital presence also limits liability to
individuals who witness actual bullying, not entire pages where one piece
of content is objectionable. For example, an Internet user might visit a
website with many innocuous pieces of content and only one instance of
cyberbullying. The user would need to manifest public digital presence, by
“liking” the content, commenting on it, or digitally recording a “view” or
“hit,” for that piece of bullying content to trigger the Cyber-Samaritan’s
Duty. The presence of a witness must be publicly recorded as to specific
pieces of content rather than entire web pages with varied content. While
this specificity likely excludes many nonreporting witnesses from the scope
of the statute, the narrow framing helps to prevent liability from attaching
to innocent users who view a website without ever actually witnessing the
bullying.
The immunity provision contained in subsection (5) diminishes the
anticooperative effects that might emerge from criminalizing the failure to
immediately report cyberbullying. Witnesses often fail to initially act
because of panic, fear, or uncertainty but decide after a period of reflection
226

See infra text accompanying notes 268–70.
For example, Facebook allows users to “like” content or pages and thereafter displays the
individual’s name beneath the “liked” content and links to that individual’s profile. See Facebook Help
Center, supra note 218.
228
For example, YouTube publicly displays the number of views a particular piece of content
receives. See YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
229
See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
227
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to provide information to law enforcement.230 A duty to report as soon as
reasonably practicable criminalizes the hesitation of these potential
reporters and lessens the likelihood that they will come forward at all.231 As
Professor Eugene Volokh notes, “Delayed reports, though less valuable
than rescues and prompt reports, are important crime-solving tools . . . .”232
The immunity provision protects and encourages the cooperation of those
who decide to report information after a delay.233 The proposed CyberSamaritan’s Duty contains carefully circumscribed language designed to
impose obligations on the individuals who, by their presence, contribute to
cyberbullying and are in a position to prevent potential physical harm by
notifying authorities.
The proposed statute withstands the constitutional attack that it
restricts protected speech under the First Amendment. Digital presence
may not be “speech” in a meaningful sense at all, particularly when digital
presence is merely recorded as a “hit” signaling that a person has viewed a
piece of content. Even if a bystander does create electronic speech, for
example by “liking” a piece of content,234 the government’s interest in
protecting speech without real value is not outweighed by its compelling
interest in protecting children from the real harm caused by that speech.235
B. Penalties and Enforcement
The appropriate penalty for violation of the Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty
must balance the traditional goals of criminal punishment with the unique
nature of a crime that is most often committed by juveniles. The goals of
any punishment include incapacitation, retribution, deterrence, and
rehabilitation.236 The traditional punishment for Bad Samaritan violations,
imprisonment, is not entirely appropriate for the failure to report
cyberbullying. If the goal is incapacitation, jail time excessively punishes
young people.

230

Professor Eugene Volokh terms these individuals “Delayed Samaritans.” See Eugene Volokh,
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An equally effective option to incapacitate such behavior is to prohibit
offenders from using the specific forms of Internet communication that
most easily facilitate bullying, such as social networking sites and pictureor video-sharing websites. A court might bar the witness who failed to
report from using specified websites as a condition of probation. Probation
officers routinely ensure compliance with the prohibition on use of
controlled substances by using random drug testing.237 A similar model of
random compliance checks could be used for a ban on social networking,
for example by screening the banned websites for matching profiles or
accessing the cyberbully’s computer to screen the browsing history.
Models for enforcing this type of condition can be drawn from other legal
contexts: for example, a law banning the use of social media by jurors,
punishable by criminal contempt, recently passed in California.238 This
punishment may be especially effective for young people because their
real-life social identities are so intertwined with their virtual activity.239
The possibility that access to social technology could be removed or
restricted also deters passivity by making the failure to report far less
attractive than reporting.240 The value of a deterrent, however, relies to a
greater extent on the certainty of punishment than the severity of
punishment.241 Bad Samaritan statutes therefore might have little deterrent
value because in the past they have been only selectively enforced, with
rare prosecutions and even rarer convictions.242 Prosecutors are better able
to identify witnesses to cyberbullying through their digital footprints,243
however, which creates a greater likelihood that any individual offender
will be prosecuted. As with Bad Samaritan laws that operate in physical, as
opposed to digital, space, prosecutors might lack the resources to prosecute
every witness that fails to report. But the statute provides a tool for
prosecutors when they determine that pursuing a particular witness is an
effective use of resources, such as when the victim of cyberbullying is
seriously harmed or killed. When such prosecutions are highly publicized,
even if rare, they may operate to make the consequences of failing to report
cyberbullying more salient.
The other traditional punitive measure for violation of Bad Samaritan
laws, a modest fine, is more appropriate to the cyberbullying context. Since
the Bad Samaritan can report to the authorities with no or very insignificant
237
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cost, there need not be a large fine to punish inaction.244 Even a modest fine
is likely to be significant to a teenager or young adult without a source of
significant income. In addition, the fines may be used to fund rehabilitative
programs that educate young people in appropriate pro-social interactions
intended to protect the rights and welfare of other people. Many individuals
who fail to report cyberbullying might benefit from educational
programming that teaches them to become active defenders rather than
joining in or passively observing bullying.245 Assertiveness training might
help these young people to resist peer pressure and increase their belief in
their own self-efficacy,246 and such programs would be an effective form of
rehabilitative punishment for witnesses who fail to report. Alternatively,
fines might be used to fund peer helpers who act as a resource for
victims.247 A combination of modest fines, educational programs, and
removal from cyberspaces where bullying occurs248 are appropriate
punishments to deter, incapacitate, and reform the passive bystanders of
cyberbullying.
Enforcement of Bad Samaritan statutes has been traditionally
problematic, both because of the large number of potential offenders and
because of the difficulty in interpreting a potentially threatening situation.
For traditional Bad Samaritan behavior, it would be impossible to
determine culpability among a group of witnesses and unfair to punish the
entire group when there might be good reasons not to act.249 One reason
that individuals in crowds fail to act is the bystander effect, where the
presence of other bystanders reduces each witness’s sense of responsibility
and motivation to help.250 Each of the multiple bystanders interprets the
inaction of the others as an indication that there is nothing to be done,
resulting in “pluralistic ignorance.”251 The purpose of the Bad Samaritan
statute is to deter pluralistic ignorance and encourage action from all
bystanders.252 Bad Samaritan statutes that excuse liability when there is a
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possibility of aid by another person only exacerbate the bystander effect,
encouraging individuals to shift responsibility to others.253
Another enforcement problem arises in traditional Bad Samaritan law
contexts because of the inability to identify witnesses. After a crime has
been committed, there is often no record of who was present to witness the
crime. Law enforcement is better able to identify witnesses to
cyberbullying than witnesses of traditional crime, however, because
Internet users leave a digital footprint of their activity. While devoting
sufficient resources to the prosecution of Bad Cyber-Samaritans would be
challenging, prosecutors are able to identify witnesses to cyberbullying and
hold them accountable.
The ambiguity of many dangerous situations creates another potential
barrier to enforcement of affirmative duties. It will often not be apparent to
a bystander whether the electronic communication is truly abusive or
threatening, or whether it presents a risk of bodily harm to the victim. If the
witness is reasonably mistaken about how serious the cyberbullying is,
officials cannot enforce the Bad Samaritan law against that witness.254 By
specifically enumerating the situations that require reporting, however, the
proposed Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty removes much potential ambiguity. Any
electronic communication that threatens violence creates an obligation to
report, whether or not such communication was made in jest or with a
serious intent to harm another.255
The number of individuals who violate the proposed statute by
witnessing cyberbullying and failing to report is potentially vast, which
makes consistent prosecution of the offense difficult.256 The problems in
enforcing the statute, however, are not sufficient justification for refusing
to adopt the law in the first place. Although the deterrent value of a
criminal law decreases when it is inconsistently enforced, the normative
value remains. A criminal law is a normative statement of a community’s
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shared values, and the law communicates the community’s definitive
rejection of cyberbullying.257
IV. THE NEW AGE OF CYBER-SAMARITANS
A. Breaking the Code of Silence
The Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty will reform the normative standards that
promote silence in reaction to cyberbullying among young people. The
duty attempts to prompt assistance from what Professor Volokh terms the
“Legally Swayable Samaritan”—the person who would not assist a stranger
in peril without a law but would be swayed to act by the law’s effect in
coercing or normatively encouraging compliance.258 Although Volokh
argues that few people will be legally swayable by the imposition of a legal
duty to act, his argument rests on the ability of bystanders to escape
identification as a witness if they simply remain silent.259 The coercive
effect of an affirmative legal duty is much stronger in cyberspace, however,
because witnesses to a crime—including the covered cyberbullying
communications—leave a virtual record of their presence that is traceable
through their IP addresses.260 The application of criminal liability to those
who fail to report cyberbullying should increase the level of reporting and
direct the attention of law enforcement to the most serious threats.261
The proposed Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty would effectively break the
code of silence and encourage reporting in the most harmful cases of
cyberbullying by providing a clear normative standard and a means of
fulfilling that standard. Rules of law that parallel moral duties function to
educate citizens and guide behavior.262 Indeed, empirical research indicates
that people in jurisdictions where duties to rescue are legally required are
more likely to regard such duties as morally required.263 Well-publicized
Bad Samaritan laws will promote action from those who would usually
passively stand by while another is in danger.264 The clear normative
257
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statement of the proposed statute gives young people direction as to what
they can do to help the situation. It is important that the statute provide
specific direction because many young people fail to act to assist victims of
bullying because they do not know what they can do to help.265
Encouraging reporting from children is the most direct way to increase
reporting of cyberbullying,266 allowing law enforcement to become
involved before serious physical harm occurs. In addition, demonstrations
of condemnation by peers deter a bully from continuing her abuse. One
empirical study found that when bystanders intervened in support of
victims, bullying stopped quickly, which indicates that “increasing
bystanders’ socially responsible behavior, and the skills and beliefs that
support its execution, may help reduce . . . bullying.”267 An avenue for
reporting cyberbullying to law enforcement provides another opportunity
for witnesses to support the victim, in addition to directly confronting the
bully.
B. Reporting in Practice
The imposition of the Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty requires a
corresponding response from law enforcement authorities to whom young
people report cyberbullying. The inconsistent response of law enforcement
to reports of crimes plagues the effectiveness of affirmative duties to
report. Many people refuse to assist victims of crime out of fear of
retribution; if reporting is to be a viable alternative for these individuals,
they must believe that police will respect their anonymity.268 In addition,
individuals must feel that police will take them seriously and respond to
their reports.269 This lack of serious response from police is an especially
sensitive problem for reports of cyberbullying, as many students already
experience inappropriate or no reactions from parents and educators, and
may be deterred from reporting if there is no response.270
The social networking sites and other websites that provide the venue
for cyberbullying and other abusive electronic behaviors might also
contribute to the ability of young people to express disapproval of and
report cyberbullying. Some websites have created a mechanism for
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community moderation, such as flagging, whereby community members
can identify particular communications as abusive or offensive.271
Alternatively, websites promote private requests to remove offensive
material by linking a complaint form directly to individual pieces of
content, such as text or pictures.272 Still other websites include a function
allowing users to report abusive content directly to the site operators.273
Reporting to site operators does not fulfill the Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty, as
this limited reporting does not notify law enforcement or public officials.
However, in the future law enforcement authorities might collaborate with
social networking sites to facilitate reporting directly to the authorities.
This collaboration would streamline the reporting process and make it
easier for young people to break the code of silence. These and other
emerging technologies facilitate peer expressions of disapproval that deter
future bullying. They also encourage teens to report serious cyberbullying
to law enforcement who can step in before prolonged abuse results in
physical harm.
CONCLUSION
Bullying, and more recently cyberbullying, plagues young people at
school and home and creates a hostile and threatening environment.
Bullying takes place within a complex group dynamic where bystanders to
the bullying, through their silence, contribute to the power of the bully and
the victimization of the target. Bad Samaritan laws, though traditionally
resisted in common law jurisdictions, have gained traction in many
American states. They provide the solution to promote action by the not
entirely innocent bystanders of cyberbullying. As with all laws, devoting
sufficient resources to effectively enforce the law remains problematic. But
by requiring bystanders to report to law enforcement in circumstances that
present a risk of physical harm to the victim, a Cyber-Samaritan’s Duty
breaks the code of silence that protects bullies and entraps victims. The
Duty expresses a new normative code for cyberspace that does not tolerate
harassment and abuse.
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